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The success of the current Doha Round of the WTO negotiations on agriculture 
will require substantial reform in each of the three areas of market access, export 
subsidies and domestic  support. Substantial improvement in market access for 
agricultural products will be an essential requirement for achieving a successful 
outcome. However, the extent of improvement in market access resulting from the 
current negotiations will largely depend on the form and the approach followed to 
reduce tariffs and expand tariff rate quotas. 
In this paper different approaches to expanding market access for grains area 
analysed using a partial equilibrium model. Simulated scenarios include linear 
reductions  in  applied  tariffs  and  expansions  in  tariff  rate  quotas,  which  are 
contrasted with a scenario representing market access proposals of the Cairns 
Group of countries in the current WTO agricultural negotiations. 
The effects of these two trade liberalisation scenarios on world prices and trade 
are analysed and discussed. Results indicate that to achieve a meaningful gain in 
market access for grains, WTO members must agree to either directly reduce the 
current applied tariffs or make large percentage reductions to the WTO bound 
rates, which lead to effective reductions in the current applied rates. 
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The  Uruguay  Round  Agreement  on  Agriculture  was  a  significant  step  toward  the 
liberalisation of trade in agricultural commodities. In that agreement WTO members 
made a commitment to provide improved market access through reductions to trade 
barriers, reduce subsidised exports and reduce the value domestic support.  
Despite these commitments the degree of trade liberalisation resulting from the Uruguay 
Round  was  only  modest.  This  means  that  the  task  of  substantially  advancing 
international agricultural policy reform lies ahead. 
The current Doha round of the WTO agricultural negotiations provide an opportunity to 
achieve fundamental reform of distorting policies across agriculture, including in the 
grains sector. In this Doha round WTO members once again affirmed their commitment 
to engage in negotiations that will lead to, among other things, substantial improvement 
in market access.  
To achieve this goal substantial expansion in tariff rate quotas and substantial reduction 
in tariffs that restrict trade are required. However, the extent of improvement in market 
access resulting from the current negotiations will largely depend on the form and the 
approach agreed to reduce tariffs and expand tariff rate quotas. 
The aim in this paper is to give an overview of markets access barriers to trade in grains 
and to assess the effect of different approaches of market access liberalisation for grains 
on world grains markets. To achieve this two policy experiments are carried out using 
ABARE’s Grains Model. In the first experiment, the size of all tariff rate quotas for 
grains, oilseed products and palm oil are doubled and all applied tariffs — including in-
quota  and  above-quota  tariffs  —  are  reduced  by  50  per  cent.  While  in  the  second 
experiment the Cairns
1 Group proposal to improve market access in the current WTO 
agricultural negotiations is modeled. 
                                                 
1 Members of the Cairns Group are Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and 
Uruguay. 






·  For  tariff  reductions  to  result  in  effective  improvement  in  market  access  for 
grains it will be necessary to either agree to reduce the actual applied tariffs or to 
have large percentage cuts to bound tariffs to ensure reductions to applied tariffs.  
·  Substantial increase in quota volumes and/or substantial reductions in above-
quota tariffs are required to ensure effective improved access in markets where 
tariff rate quotas restrict trade. 
·  As applied tariff rates for grains are much lower than bound tariff rates in many 
cases, a repeat of the Uruguay round approach of implementing average cuts of 
36 per cent to bound tariffs, with a minimum cut of 15 per cent, will not be 
sufficient to achieve a reduction in applied tariff rates. 
·  Increased access to grains, oilseed products and palm oil has the potential to 
deliver net increases in the value of world trade and prices. Most of the potential 
gains  from  improvement  in  market  access  come  from  liberalising  restrictive 
WTO bound tariff rate quotas in Japan, the European Union, Korea and China. 
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 An overview of global grain markets 
The global grains market is characterised by: 
·  countries with large domestic markets that are also large producers; 
·  import dependent countries with medium sized domestic markets but little domestic 
production; and 
·  a small number of major exporters. 
 
Countries with large domestic wheat markets that import only a small proportion of 
their domestic use include India
1, Pakistan, China, the Russian Federation, Turkey and 
the Ukraine. These six countries are among the largest ten wheat markets in the world. 
However, all import less than 10 per cent of their domestic wheat requirements (table 
1). 
In the case of India, Pakistan, China and Turkey, high tariffs or nontariff barriers restrict 
imports.  In  cases  like  these,  where  trade  barriers  restrict  imports  to  large  markets, 
effective liberalisation of trade barriers has the potential to provide significant increases 
in market access globally and to increase world market prices. 
There are also a number of countries with medium sized domestic markets that import 
virtually  all  of  their  domestic  use.  While  these  countries  have  moderate  domestic 
markets, they make up some of the world’s largest wheat importers. For example, the 
Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Algeria and Brazil all import over 
80 per cent of their use. These countries are among the largest ten wheat importers 
globally. 
The United States, the European Union, Canada, Australia and Argentina are the major 
world  wheat  exporters,  while  the  United  States  dominates  the  global  maize  market 
(table 1). Of the main exporters, the United States and the European Union have been 
major users of export subsidies in the past, particularly for wheat. 
                                                 
1 In some years India is a net wheat exporter. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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1 Wheat and maize: Global supply and disposal, 2000 
Ranked by consumption 
  Production  Consumption  Imports  Exports 
  kt  kt  kt  kt 
Wheat   
China  99 600  115 500  2 000  700 
European Union  104 150  88 923  3 300  14 300 
India  75 754  65 865  100  1 569 
Former Soviet Republics a  64 385  65 290  5 570  4 550 
United States  60 501  36 170  2 449  28 876 
Middle East b  13 085  30 725  16 760  550 
Eastern Europe c  28 205  30 627  3 903  2 579 
Pakistan  21 079  20 500  150  200 
North Africa d  3 586  15 986  11 000  220 
Turkey  15 037  15 812  2 776  2000 
Egypt  6 564  12 500  5 800  0 
Brazil  1 595  9 900  7 900  0 
Canada  26 804  9 576  20  17 292 
ASEAN e  0  9 375  9 750  375 
Japan  688  6 077  5 854  0 
Argentina  15 960  5 849  0  11 086 
Mexico  3 398  5 634  2 784  548 
Australia  22 190  5 134  0  16 082 
Bangladesh  1 840  3 390  1 200  0 
Republic of Korea  5  2 939  2 721  0 
Ethiopia  1 900  2 750  850  0 
Republic of South Africa  2 317  2 600  600  300 
Other  7 284  22 103  14 988  248 
World  575 928  583 226  100 475  100 475 
 
Maize 
United States  253 208  196 605  254  54 613 
China  105 000  120 000  150  4 000 
European Union  38 890  40 808  2 500  100 
Brazil  37 000  35 400  250  150 
Mexico  18 500  24 300  5 800  15 
ASEAN e  16 765  21 405  4 605  150 
Japan  1  16 050  16 000  0 
India  12 000  12 000  400  5 
Egypt  5 800  10 300  4 500  0 
Canada  6 800  8 900  1 600  100 
Republic of Korea  85  8 300  8 000  0 
South Africa  8 500  8 300  50  1 000 
Argentina  15 000  6 500  15  8 500 
Taiwan  24  5 200  5 100  0 
Turkey  2 400  3 600  1 200  0 
Colombia  1 000  3 000  2 000  0 
Other  63 453  83 793  19 771  3 512 
World  584 426  604 461  72 145  72 145 
a Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakstan, Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. b Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen United. c Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Former Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, 




The market access elements of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture focused 
on converting nontariff barriers to tariffs; reducing bound tariff rates; and ensuring the 
provision of at least minimum access opportunities and maintenance of current access 
levels, mainly through establishing tariff rate quotas (see box 1 for an explanation of 
key terms). For the current WTO agriculture negotiations to result in improved market 
access, the focus must be on the barriers that continue to constrain trade, particularly 
binding tariff rate quotas and high applied tariffs. 
The  market  access  arrangements  that  apply  to  grains  tend  to  fall  into  one  of  two 
extremes — very restrictive or relatively open. This tends to be the case irrespective of 
whether the country applies tariff rate quotas or tariff only protection. A number of 
countries also maintain state purchasing arrangements, which act as nontariff barriers. 
 
Box 1: Key terms 
Applied tariff rate: The actual tariff that is applied at a particular time. 
Bound tariff rate: The maximum rate that a WTO member undertakes to apply. The bound rate 
provides  a  ceiling  that  applied  tariff  rates  cannot  exceed  except  by  negotiation,  with 
compensation to the affected trading partners. 
Tariff rate quota (tariff quota): The use of a reduced tariff rate for a specified volume of 
imports, while imports beyond these volumes face a higher tariff rate. 
In-quota tariff: The reduced tariff rate that applies for the specified quantities that enter within 
a tariff quota. 
Above-quota tariff: The tariff rate that applies to quantities imported in excess of the tariff 
quota quantity. 
Minimum access: Members were required to ensure minimum access opportunities equal to 3 
per cent of base period (1986–88) consumption in 1995, rising to 5 per cent of base period 
consumption by 2000.  
Swiss formula: A formula for tariff reduction, which places an upper bound on tariffs and 
reduces higher tariffs proportionately more than the lower tariffs. The formula is represented as 
follows: 
Final tariff = (A * initial tariff) / (A + initial tariff)    
Where A is the upper bound on all tariffs. 
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Tariff rate quotas 
Most WTO member countries with tariff rate quotas for grains imported more than their 
scheduled quotas in 2000, often substantially more (table 2). For example, Brazil, one of 
the  world’s  largest  wheat  importers,  imported  over  ten  times  its  wheat  tariff  quota, 
mainly  duty  free  from  Argentina.  Most  tariff  rate  quotas  for  grains  have  not  been 
binding because applied tariffs (the tariffs that are actually used) have been substantially 
lower than the bound above-quota tariff rates negotiated under the WTO (table 2).  
Also, imports are often subject to preferential tariffs that are lower than these general 
applied  tariffs.  For  example,  in  2000  wheat  imports  by  Brazil,  Colombia,  Israel, 
Mexico,  Morocco,  Poland  and  Tunisia  were  influenced  by  at  least  one  regional  or 
bilateral  trade  agreement  that  provided  market  access  to  specific  trading  partners  at 
reduced tariff rates, or duty free. The tariff rates set for grain from countries outside 
these trade agreements were typically lower than the bound above-quota tariff rates, but 
were usually high enough to constrain or prohibit imports from these other nations. For 
example, Mexico applies a prohibitive general tariff of 198 per cent to maize imports. 
However, under NAFTA, imports from Canada and the United States are subject to a 3 
per cent tariff (table 2). Although maize imports from the United States are subject to a 
tariff  quota,  the  quota  has  always  been  extended  by  waiving  the  above-quota  tariff 
whenever consumption has approached the quota volume (Juarez 2001). 
The extent of additional access beyond scheduled tariff quotas is significant relative to 
the size of world trade. For example, in 2000 the WTO tariff rate quotas for wheat 
totalled 13 million tonnes, while imports from countries with tariff rate quotas totalled 
29 million tonnes. For maize, tariff rate quotas totalled almost 14 million tonnes, while 
imports from countries with tariff rate quotas totalled over 23 million tonnes (table 2). 
This additional access beyond scheduled tariff quota volumes represented about 15 per 
cent of world wheat trade and about 13 per cent of world maize trade in 2000. 
In  cases  where  the  scheduled  tariff  rate  quotas  do  not  constrain  grain  imports, 
negotiating  increased  quota  volumes  or  reduced  above-quota  tariffs  is  unlikely  to 
increase  access  to  these  markets.  Even  doubling  wheat  tariff  quotas  would  have  no 
effect on imports by most of these countries. This contrasts with the situation with dairy 
products, reported in Shaw and Love (2001) where tariff quotas restrict trade in many 
countries. 
While most countries that apply tariff rate quotas for grains provide relatively liberal 
access for grains, access to a number of other tariff rate quota markets is quite restricted. 
The European Union, Japan and Venezuela for wheat, and the European Union, India, 
Korea and possibly Poland for maize, apply very restrictive tariff rate quotas at their 
bound rates (table 2).  ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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2 Tariff rate quotas for wheat and maize: 2000 
  TRQ Imports   Bound tariffs  Applied tariffs   Regional Trade  
  Quantity    In-quota  Above-quota  GeneralPreferential   Agreement 
  kt  kt  %  %  %  % 
Wheat 
Brazil  750  7900  0.0  50.6  12.5  0.0  Mercosur 
Canada  227  20  1.9  76.5  50.0  0.0  NAFTA 
Colombia  692  1100  124.0  130.0  17.0  13.2  Andean Community 
European Union a  350  3300  0.0  25.0  na  0.0  Central Europe 
Israel  450  1600  92.0  137.8  50.0  0.0  EU, US 
Japan b  5740  5854  244.8  414.3  235.4  N/A 
Mexico  605  2785  70.1  70.1  67.0  4.5  NAFTA 
Morocco  1555  3300  144.0  198.4  55.0  2.5  EU 
Poland  338  860  25.0  64.0  15.0  0.0  EU 
South Africa  104  600  19.0  93.0  26.0  N/A 
Tunisia  900  1300  17.0  108.0  44.0  na  EU 
Venezuela  1271  1400  24.0  122.8  53.0  N/A 
Total  12982  28848 
 
Maize 
Colombia  34  1800  80.0  227.0  46.0  N/A 
Dominican Republic  703  1100  5.0  74.0  na  N/A 
Ecuador  18  300  25.0  47.0  15.0  Mercosur,  
            Andean Community 
European Union  2500  2500  0.0  76.0  na  0  Central Europe 
India  350  400  15.0  50.0    N/A 
Mexico  2501  5327  50.0  203.3  198.0  3  NAFTA 
Morocco  204  750  122.0  137.4  17.5  na  EU 
Philippines  178  600  35.0  65.0  na  N/A 
Poland  250  330  20.0  64.0  20.0  na  EU, Central Europe 
Republic of Korea  6102  8000  2.3  343.0  na  N/A 
South Africa  221  50  11.0  56.0  12.4  N/A 
Thailand  54  200  20.0  81.6  na  N/A 
Venezuela  624  1350  20.0  127.2  na  N/A 
Total  13685  23180 
 
a Commitments are for the EU15, which incorporates commitments of Austria and Finland. The EU also provides access for 600 
000 tonnes of wheat from countries of central Europe under preferential arrangements. b Bound tariff rates are the ad valorem 
equivalent of the maximum in-quota and above-quota mark ups that can be applied. The maximum in-quota markup is ¥46.5 per 
kilogram, while the maximum above-quota markup is ¥55 per kilogram. The applied mark up in 2000 was ¥30.8 per kilogram. na 
not available. N/A not applicable. 
Sources: WTO (1994; 2000). ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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Tariff only protection 
A number of prominent grain markets have very high bound tariff rates. For example in 
2000, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey had bound tariffs of 100 per cent or 
more for wheat, while Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey also had bound tariffs of 150 per 
cent or more for maize. A number of other markets had bound rates of over 50 per cent 
(table 3). 
3 Ad valorem tariffs for wheat and maize: 2000 
  Bound  Applied  Tariff equivalent a 
    General  Preferential 
  %  %  %  % 
Wheat 
Chile  32.9  9.0 
China b  na  142.0 
Ecuador  19.0  10.0  0 
Egypt  5.0  1.0   
India  100.0  50.0     
Indonesia  28.2  0.0 
Malaysia  0.0  0.0 
Nigeria  150.0  23.0 
Pakistan  150.0      45.7 
Peru  83.6  25.0 
Philippines  38.0  3.0 
Republic of Korea  5.1  2.3 
Russia   na  5.0  0.0 c 
Saudi Arabia  na      223.9 
Sri Lanka  0.0  20.0 
Thailand  105.5  18.6 
Turkey  188.0  55.0  0.0 d 
 
Maize 
Brazil  47.8  10.5  0.0 e 
Chile  0.0  9.0  5.4 e 
China b  na  142.0 
Egypt  5.0  0.0 
Indonesia  52.0  0.0 
Israel   42.8    0.0 f 
Japan  50.0  50.0 
Malaysia  5.4  0.0 
Nigeria  150  70.0 
Pakistan  150.0  10.0    nc 
Peru  97.2  25.0 
Russia   na  5.0  0.0 c 
Turkey  188.0  50.0  0.0 d 
a ad valorem tariff equivalent of nontariff barriers. b The general applied rates shown are for 1999. Details of the tariff 
quotas to apply with China’s accession to the WTO are provided in table 4. c Kazakhstan, Belarus, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. d European Union and Central Europe. e Mercosur. f United States and European Union. na not applicable. 
nc not calculated 
 Source: WTO (1994). ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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Like the situation with tariff rate quotas, however, countries with tariff only protection 
tend  to  apply  tariffs  that  are  much  lower  than  the  WTO  bound  tariffs  rates.  This 
maintains the opportunity for these countries to increase tariff protection to bound levels 
in the future. Very large cuts to bound tariffs will be necessary to reduce and potentially 
eliminate the scope to increase applied tariffs in the future.  
While applied tariffs are often much lower than bound tariffs, they are still restrictive in 
a number of cases. Applied tariffs for wheat of between 18 and 25 per cent operate in 
Peru, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Thailand, while India has an applied tariff of 50 per cent.  
Wheat imports by countries with high import barriers have been very small, accounting 
for less than 5 per cent of world wheat trade in 2000. However, some of these countries, 
including China, India and Pakistan, have large domestic markets that account for 30 
per cent of world wheat consumption. 
Non-tariff barriers create very high implicit rates of protection against wheat imports in 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent in India. For example, state purchasing 
agencies regulate cereal trade in India and Pakistan, which includes licensing imports 
and subsidising exports depending on domestic production patterns. 
For other  countries such as Ecuador and Turkey,  regional trade agreements provide 
lower preferential tariffs or duty free access to regional trading partners. While Turkey 
applies a tariff rate of 50–55 per cent to imports from non-EU sources, most of its grain 
imports come duty free from the European Union. Brazil, Chile, Canada, Israel, the 
Russian Federation and Turkey are signatories to regional trade agreements that result 
in lower tariffs or duty free maize imports. Russia, which is currently outside the WTO, 
provides preferential access to several former Soviet wheat producing nations.  
Overall, since the tariff rate quotas for grains of many WTO members are not binding 
and  their  applied  tariffs  are  substantially  lower  than  their  bound  rates,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  expand  quotas  and/or  reduce  tariffs  by  a  large  percentage  to  gain  an 
increase in market access. Also, with the differences between bound and applied tariff 
rates it is evident that a repeat of the Uruguay Round approach of implementing average 
cuts of 36 per cent to bound tariffs, with a minimum cut of 15 per cent, will not be 
sufficient to achieve a reduction in the actual applied tariff rates for grains in many 
WTO members. 
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Impacts of improved market access for grains 
The ABARE Grains Model was used to simulate liberalisation of world grain, oilseed 
and  oilseed  product  markets.  This  model  is  an  enhanced  version  of  the  OECD 
AGLINK
1  model,  adding  trade  policies  for  the  OECD  countries  represented  in  the 
model, and import demand for an additional 45 countries (see appendix A). The model 
was calibrated to reproduce the actual conditions in world grain markets in the year 
2000. Subsequent years are simulated to show the long term effect of supply response 
and other model dynamics relative to the year 2000. 
Policy experiments were carried out for the year 2000. That year was chosen as it was 
the most recent year for which all relevant data, particularly applied tariff rates, were 
available. The historical data for 2000 provided a base against which trade liberalisation 
experiments were compared. The simulation results therefore reflect market conditions 
and settings in 2000, and should be interpreted as how grain markets would have looked 
in 2000 had markets been liberalised in that year. A prospective medium term baseline 
was not considered in this analysis. Simulating the effects of trade liberalisation in 2000 
avoids disagreements over commodity market projections and the impact of policies and 
market shocks after 2000, such as the Argentinean crisis and the 2002 US farm bill. 
Two  policy  experiments  were  carried  out  to  simulate  global  trade  liberalisation  of 
wheat,  coarse  grain,  oilseed  products,  and  palm  oil.  In  the  first  experiment  trade 
liberalisation was modeled by doubling the tariff rate quotas and halving the tariff rates 
applied by WTO member countries in the  year 2000.  In the second experiment the 
market access element of the Cairns Group proposal, which calls for the expansion of 
tariff  rate  quotas  and  the  use  of  a  ‘Swiss  formula’  to  cut  WTO  bound  tariffs,  was 
modeled. 
Although Russia is applying for WTO membership, it was assumed that Russia, along 
with other non-WTO members, such as Iran, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, will not be 
bound by an agreement on agricultural trade liberalisation resulting from the current 
WTO negotiations. Consequently, tariffs for all nonmembers were left unchanged. For 
China, post-accession tariff rate quotas and tariff schedules were used. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Conforti and Londero 2001. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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A. Doubling tariff rate quotas and halving applied tariffs 
In this first experiment, tariff rate quotas for all WTO members were doubled and all 
applied tariff rates were halved. Since the EU tariff quota for wheat of 350 000 tonnes 
was considerably smaller than the 3–5 per cent minimum market access levels agreed 
under the Uruguay Round, it was necessary first to establish the appropriate tariff quota 
for 2000 in order to examine the impacts of an effective expansion of tariff quotas. This 
required increasing the EU tariff quota for wheat in 2000 to 3.3 million tonnes (5 per 
cent of 1986–88 average wheat consumption in the EU15). Trade liberalisation in the 
European Union was then modeled by expanding this quota and reducing the in-quota 
and above-quota tariffs.  
With the expansion of tariff quotas and reduction in tariffs, demand for grain, oilseed, 
oilseed oil and palm oil increased, and  as  a result world prices rose  relative to the 
reference case without liberalisation. Increased world prices relative to their reference 
levels in 2000 are shown in figure A. These increases were modest because barriers to 
trade in grains were generally low, as discussed earlier, and import demand in many 
countries was relatively unresponsive to price changes. 
A  Changes  in  the  world  prices  and  volume  of  trade  in  the  first  year  following 












The volume of trade in all commodities, except for oilseed meal, increased modestly 
relative to the 2000 reference level (figure A). The combined effect of modest increases 
in price and volume was a considerable increase in the value of trade – around US$810 
million for wheat; US$660 for coarse grains and US$375 million for palm oil (figure 
B).  ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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B Change in value of world trade, in the second year following liberalisation, relative to 




















The increase in the value of world trade was mostly due to increased access to European 
Union, Chinese, Japanese and Korean markets. These countries all had restrictive WTO 
tariff rate quotas and/or high tariffs for grain and/or oils. In addition, these countries 
also applied these bound rates in 2000. In markets that were highly protected by tariff 
rate quotas or tariffs, increased market access caused import prices (world price plus the 
tariff) to fall, and imports and consumption to increase relative to the 2000 reference 
level. The increased global demand for cereals, oilseed oil and palm oil led to increased 
world prices for these commodities. 
In markets that were less protected, such as Egypt and Brazil, tariff reductions were not 
sufficient to outweigh increased world prices, resulting in increased import prices and 
reduced  imports.  Non-WTO  members  such  as  Russian  Federation,  Iran  and  Algeria 
faced higher import prices for all commodities, as their tariffs were not reduced, and 
consequently their imports fell. 
Countries that export grain or oilseed products increased their exports in response to 
increased world prices relative to the 2000 reference level, except in the case of oilseed 
meal. With minimal production response in the short term, increased exports in the first 
year following liberalisation occurred mainly as a result of reduced consumption and 
stocks  in  exporting  countries.  Increased  production  due  to  higher  world  prices 
contributed to greater increases in exports in following years. 
Wheat and coarse grain 
For  wheat,  the  increase  in  trade  was  mainly  due  to  an  expansion  of  quotas  in  the 
European Union, Japan and China, which caused import prices to fall relative to the 
2000  reference  level  (figure  C).  Lower  import  prices  caused  imports  of  wheat  to 
increase by 1.1 million tonnes (33 per cent) in the European Union, by 1.3 million 
tonnes (22 per cent) in Japan, and by 439 000 tonnes (22 per cent) in China (figure D). ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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C Wheat and coarse grain import prices, in the first year following liberalisation, relative 










For  coarse  grain,  increased  demand  was  mainly  the  result  of  an  expansion  in  the 
European Union and Korean quotas, resulting in lower import prices relative to the 
reference case (figure C). European Union imports of coarse grain increased by 2.3 
million tonnes (82 per cent), while Korean imports increased by 1.4 million tonnes (13 
per cent) (figure D). 
Changing price relativities in the Korean market following trade liberalisation resulted 
in a substitution away from the feed use of wheat. The dramatic fall in the coarse grain 
import  price  following  liberalisation  contrasts  with  the  slight  increase  in  the  wheat 
import price (figure C). The increase in Korean wheat import price occurs because the 
increase in the world price outweighs the effect of the cut to the import tariff of 3 per 
cent. Consequently, coarse grain imports increased while wheat imports, mainly feed 
wheat, fell by 500 000 tonnes (figure D). 
D Wheat and coarse grain imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative to the 
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In contrast a combination of higher import price for coarse grain and lower import price 
for wheat in Japan caused coarse grain imports to fall and those of wheat to rise. Since 
Japan imposed no tariff on maize used for feed, an increase in the world price of coarse 
grain due to liberalisation caused the import price in Japan to increase by 3.3 per cent 
relative to the reference case (figure C). As a result, imports of coarse grain fell by 1.1 
million tonnes and imports of feed wheat increased by around 840 000 tonnes (figure 
D).  
Although import prices for wheat and coarse grain fell significantly in the European 
Union and China, their domestic prices fell by less than half a per cent, indicating that 
the effect of increased market access on domestic producers is minimal. This is because 
imports form a small proportion of total wheat and coarse grain consumption in the 
European Union and China. The fall in import prices was not large enough to fill the 
expanded quotas in the European Union, Korea and China, because demand for imports 
was not sufficiently responsive to price changes. 
Trade liberalisation increased wheat and coarse grain imports relative to the reference 
case in many smaller WTO members with restrictive quotas or relatively high tariffs, 
such as Turkey, Venezuela, Tunisia, and Peru (figure E). Expanded quotas and reduced 
tariffs caused import prices in these countries to fall by more than the overall increase in 
world prices. 
E Wheat and coarse grain imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative to the 
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In  WTO  members  with  low  trade  barriers,  such  as  Brazil,  Indonesia,  Egypt,  and 
Malaysia, increased world prices following trade liberalisation outweighed the effect of 
lower tariffs on import prices. Consequently their import prices for wheat and coarse 
grain rose, and their imports fell relative to the 2000 reference level (figure F). For all 
non-WTO  countries  such  as  Russia,  Iran  and  Algeria,  some  of  whom  import  large 
quantities of grain, higher world prices reduced their wheat and coarse grain imports. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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F Wheat and coarse grain imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative to the 
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Exports from the United States, Canada, the European Union and Argentina met most of 
the  increased  demand  for  wheat  and  coarse  grain  in  the  first  year  following 
liberalisation, coming mainly from stocks, as production takes some time to respond. In 
subsequent  years  production  increased  in  response  to  higher  prices,  substantially 
increasing the value of exports from these nations (figure G). The value of Australian 
wheat exports increased by over US$150 million. 
G Change in value of world wheat and coarse grain exports in the second year following 
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In  the  United  States,  the  marketing  loan  effectively  blocked  the  benefits  of  trade 
liberalisation  from  reaching  grain  producers.  Internal  producer  prices  in  the  United 
States  remained  below  the  administratively  set  marketing  loan  rate,  resulting  in  a 
marketing loan payment to producers. Increased producer prices in the United States ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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reduced  marketing  loan  payments  without  increasing  producer  returns,  and 
consequently US grain production remained largely unchanged. The marketing loan will 
continue to block actual price signals as long as the loan rate exceeds internal prices. US 
production decisions will be made in response to the high loan rate, resulting in excess 
production. Furthermore, the lack of US production response to low world prices will 
transfer the adjustment burden to other grain producing countries. 
Oilseeds and oilseed products 
Many  WTO  members  had  relatively  low  protection  against  imports  of  oilseed  and 
oilseed products in 2000 compared to wheat or coarse grain. There were very few tariff 
rate quotas or high tariffs for oilseeds and oilseed products, with the exception of Korea. 
Where they exist, as in China, they are generally applied to oilseed oil. Low tariffs 
meant that liberalisation resulted in only slightly lower import prices of oilseeds and 
meal in most WTO member countries, with only small increases in import demand and 
world prices relative to the reference case. World oilseed meal prices also increased 
because of lower exports, as livestock producers in major exporting nations substituted 
toward oilseed meal away from wheat and coarse grain. 
Korea had a very restrictive tariff rate quota for soybean, and liberalisation resulted in a 
large fall in the import price and an increase in demand for imports. Increased market 
access caused the import price of oilseeds in Korea to fall by 83 per cent, and imports to 
increase by 608 000 tonnes (43 per cent) relative to the 2000 reference level. In most 
other WTO countries, changes in oilseed imports following liberalisation were small 
(figure H). 
H Changes in the imports of oilseeds and oilseed products in the first year following 
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In most countries, oilseeds are crushed to produce meal and oil, and changes in oilseed 
imports result from changes in the price of seed relative to the price of meal and oil. For 
most  countries  oilseeds  prices  rose  relative  to  meal  and  oil  prices,  causing  oilseeds 
imports and crush to fall in favor of meal and oil imports. The largest falls in oilseeds 
imports  following  liberalisation  occurred  in  the  European  Union,  Japan,  and  China, 
which reduced their imports by 167 000, 148 000, and 174 000 tonnes respectively 
(figure H). Oilseeds imports into Korea, Indonesia and Venezuela increased relative to 
the 2000 reference level because the price of meal and oil rose more relative to the price 
of oilseed. 
World oilseeds production fell following liberalisation as a result of major producers 
shifting resources to wheat and coarse grain, as world wheat and coarse grain prices 
increased more than the increase in world oilseeds price. 
Reduced oilseed meal exports mainly from Brazil, Canada and the United States caused 
the world meal price to increase relative to the 2000 reference level (figure I). Brazil, 
Canada and the United States increased feed use of oilseed meal and reduced the use of 
feed  wheat  and  coarse  grains  because  the  world  prices  of  wheat  and  coarse  grains 
increased more than the world price of oilseed meal. Increased domestic feed use of 
oilseed meal reduced the amount available for export. 
I Change in feed use and exports of oilseed meal in the first year following liberalisation, 











Most other WTO members had low tariffs for  oilseed meal, so higher  world prices 
generally translated into higher import prices, reducing oilseed meal imports. 
Unlike  oilseed  and  meal,  oilseed  oil  is  a  highly  protected  commodity  and  trade 
liberalisation led to lower import prices and higher imports in many WTO members 
including  China,  Japan,  and  Pakistan  (figure  H).  Substitution  away  from  oilseeds 
production  toward  coarse  grains  and  wheat  constrained  world  supply  response  to 
increased oilseed oil demand, resulting in a 2.9 per cent increase in the world price 




Expanded tariff rate quotas in China, and reduced tariffs in Pakistan and India, were the 
main drivers of the increased demand for palm oil following trade liberalisation (figure 
J). Increased import demand for palm oil in those countries caused the world palm oil 
price to increase by 7.3 per cent. The higher world price meant that all other WTO 
countries, which had low tariffs in 2000, reduced their imports relative to the 2000 
reference level. 











Palm oil prices increased significantly in the first year following liberalisation because 
supply  response  is  slow  in  the  short  term.  Additional  exports  initially  came  from 
reduced  consumption  and  stocks  in  Malaysia  and  Indonesia.  As  supply  gradually 
expands and exports increase in subsequent years, the initial impact on world palm oil 
prices is moderated (figure K). 
K  World  palm  oil  prices  and  change  in  world  palm  oil  exports  following  trade 
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B. Cairns Group proposal 
The  second  experiment  to  simulate  liberalisation  of  global  trade  in  grains  modeled 
Cairns Group proposal for improving market access in the current Doha round of WTO 
agricultural  trade  negotiations.  The  proposal  calls  for,  among  other  things,  the 
expansion of tariff rate quota access by adding 20 and 14 per cent of consumption for 
developed and developing countries respectively and the elimination of in-quota tariffs 
(Cairns Group 2002). The proposal also calls for the use of a ‘Swiss formula’ to cut 
tariffs, with a coefficient of 25 for developed countries and 50 for developing countries 
(see box 2 for the key features of the Cairns Group proposal).  
 
Box 2: Key features of the Cairns Group market access proposal 
 
Cutting  tariffs  significantly  by  applying  the  ‘Swiss  formula’,  to  reduce  all  developed 
country tariffs to 25 per cent or lower. 
Expanding  developed  country  tariff  quota  access  by  adding  20  per  cent  of  domestic 
consumption. 
Improving the administration of tariff quota. 
Eliminating the special safeguard mechanism for developed countries. Developing countries 
shall be permitted access to a new mechanism, which would operate under an agreed range 
of circumstances. 
For developing countries there will be three types of tariff reductions; 
·  Initial  tariffs  of  0-50  percent,  a ‘Swiss  formula’  shall apply  to  reduce  tariffs  to  50 
percent or lower. 
·  Initial tariffs of 50-250 per cent shall be reduced by 50 per cent. 
·  Initial tariffs over 250 per cent shall be reduced to 125 per cent. 
Lower  tariff  quota  expansion  for  developing  countries  (14  per  cent  of  domestic 
consumption) phased in over a longer period. 
Final bound tariff quota volumes in developing countries will be expanded by adding an 
amount equal to 14 per cent of domestic consumption of the product concerned over a nine 
year implementation period in equal installments. 
Tariff quota volumes are to be expanded on a most-favored nation basis. 
Within-quota tariffs shall be phased out during the implementation period for developed 
countries and phased out or reduced for developing countries. 
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To  model  the  Cairns  Group  proposal  in  this  experiment,  all  in-quota  tariffs  were 
eliminated while developed and developing countries tariff rate quotas were expanded 
by the addition of an amount equal to 20 per cent and 14 per cent respectively of their 
average  consumption  for  the  period  1998–2000.  The  ‘Swiss  formula’  was  used  to 
reduce WTO bound tariffs to a maximum tariff of 25 per cent for developed countries. 
For developing countries the ‘Swiss formula’ with a maximum tariff of 50 per cent was 
applied to all initial bound tariffs less than 50 per cent, while initial tariffs of between 
50 and 250 per cent were reduced by 50 per cent, and initial tariffs of more than 250 per 
cent were reduced to 125 per cent. In this experiment the current applied tariff was left 
unchanged if the cut in the WTO bound rate was not deep enough to affect the applied 
rate. For example the bound rate for wheat in Turkey is 180 per cent while the applied 
rate is only 55 per cent, so the cut in the bound rate to 90 per cent after liberalisation 
fails to affect the current applied rate. 
As a result of this liberalisation scenario demand for grains, oilseed products and palm 
oil increased and consequently world prices of all those commodities rose while their 
trade, except for oilseed meal also increased relative to the reference level in 2000. 
However the increase in the world prices of all commodities, with the exception of 
wheat, was smaller compared with the previous experiment, while the increase in the 
volume of trade was larger for wheat but smaller for coarse grain, oilseed oil and palm 
oil (figure L).  
L  Changes  in  the  world  prices  and  volume  of  trade,  in  the  first  year  following 











Oilseed oil Palm oil
%
Price (Doubling quotas & halving applied tariffs) Price (Cairns Group proposal)
Trade (Doubling quotas & halving applied tariffs) Trade (Cairns Group proposal)
 
Value of world trade also increased for all commodities relative to the reference level in 
2000.  The  value  of  world  wheat  trade  was  higher  than  the  level  of  the  previous 
experiment due to higher world price and larger volume of trade, while the value of 
trade for other commodities was lower (figure M). ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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M  Changes  in  the  value  of  world  trade,  in  the  second  year  following  liberalisation, 





















Doubling quotas & halving applied tariffs Cairns Group proposal
 
Wheat and coarse grain 
Following  trade  liberalisation  in  this  experiment,  import  prices  of  wheat  fell 
substantially in Japan, the European Union and China, while import prices of coarse 
grain also fell in Korea, the European Union and China (figure N). 
N Wheat and coarse grain import prices, in the first year following liberalisation, relative 
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The elimination of within-quota markup  and the substantial reduction in the above-
quota bound markup for wheat in Japan caused Japanese wheat import price to fall by 
67 per cent and imports to increase by 2.9 million tonnes relative to the reference level ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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in 2000 (figure O). Above-quota markup in this experiment fell from ¥ 55 000 a tonne 
to only ¥ 3200 a tonne (24 per cent of world price in 2000). In comparison, in the 
previous  experiment  Japan’s  import  price  for  wheat  fell  by  only  34  per  cent  and 
consequently imports increased by 1.3 million tonnes only due to the in-quota markup 
still remaining high after liberalisation. This also left the expanded quota unfilled in the 
previous  experiment.  The  substantial  increase  in  Japanese  wheat  imports  in  this 
experiment caused the volume of trade in wheat and its world price to be higher than 
both the levels of the reference case in 2000 and the previous experiment. 
O Wheat and coarse grain imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative to 
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Japan’s imports of coarse grain fell by 2.2 million tonnes compared with a fall of 1.1 
million tonnes in the previous experiment (figure O). This reflects a major substitution 
toward importing feed wheat after the substantial fall in the import price of wheat in this 
experiment relative to the previous experiment. The lower coarse grain imports in Japan 
also caused the world price and the volume of trade of coarse grain to be lower than the 
previous experiment levels. 
In many WTO member countries with very low or no tariffs such as Brazil, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Egypt, trade liberalisation in this experiment caused imports of wheat and 
coarse grain to fall relative to the reference case in 2000 (figure P).  
The fall in wheat imports in those countries was also more than the fall in the previous 
experiment due to the higher world price of wheat, while the fall in coarse grain imports 
was smaller due to the lower world price of coarse grain in this experiment relative to 
the previous experiment.  ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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P Wheat and coarse grain imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative to the 
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Imports  of  wheat  and  coarse  grain  also  fell  in  a  number  of  other  WTO  member 
countries such as Turkey and Peru where the cut in the bound tariffs for wheat was not 
deep enough to affect their applied rates. While in countries such as Tunisia where the 
cut in the bound tariffs had an impact on the applied rates, trade in wheat and coarse 
grain increased relative to the reference level in 2000 (figure Q). Other results for wheat 
and coarse grain from this experiment were largely similar to those obtained from the 
previous experiment. 
Q Wheat and coarse grain imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative to 
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Oilseeds and oilseed products 
Trade liberalisation in this experiment caused the import price of soybeans to Korea to 
fall by 63 per cent, which induced imports to increase by 506 000 tonnes (36 per cent). 
In comparison, the import price fell by 83 per cent and imports rose by 608 000 tonnes 
in  the  previous  experiment  (figure  R).  Korea  imports  almost  all  its  soybeans  and 
doubling its soybean quota in the previous experiment caused the import price to fall by 
more than the fall in this experiment where the quota was expanded by only 14 per cent 
of  1998–2000  average  consumption.  As  a  result  of  this  increased  oilseeds  imports, 
oilseed meal and oilseed oil imports fell in Korea.  
R Oilseeds and oilseed products imports, in the first year following liberalisation, relative 
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Since oilseeds imports  were not subject to restrictive quotas or high tariffs in most 
countries, the resulting increase in its world price from trade liberalisation caused its 
imports to fall and the imports of oilseed products to increase. Oilseeds imports fell in 
China, Japan and the European Union, while oilseed oil imports increased in China and 
Japan. Other results for oilseeds and oilseed products from this experiment were largely 
similar to those obtained from the previous experiment. 
Palm oil 
Imports of palm oil increased in China and Pakistan in this liberalisation scenario, while 
imports of India fell (figure S). China’s increased import of palm oil was due to the 
expansion  of  its  recent  post  WTO  accession  tariff  rate  quota.  Reducing  Pakistan’s 
bound rate for palm oil from 100 per cent to 50 per cent led to a reduction to the high 
applied  tariff  to  palm  oil  in  2000  (76  per  cent)  and  therefore  to  increased  imports. 
Reducing the bound rate for palm oil in India from 165 per cent to 83 per cent on the ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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other hand had no impact on their applied rate in 2000 (44 per cent) and led to a fall in 
their imports as the world price increased.  
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Conclusions 
The results from the two liberalisation experiments carried out in this paper indicate that 
reducing  applied  tariffs  and/or  expanding  quotas  is  necessary  to  realise  meaningful 
gains in market access for grains. This can be done in the current WTO negotiations by 
agreeing  to  either  directly  reduce  the  current  applied  tariffs  or  by  making  large 
percentage reductions in the WTO bound rates, which lead to reductions in the current 
applied rates.  
Results also indicate that liberalising market access for grains, oilseed products and 
palm oil has the potential to deliver net increases in the value of world trade and prices. 
Most of the potential gains from market access improvement in both experiments came 
from  liberalising  restrictive  WTO  bound  tariff  rate  quotas  in  a  small  number  of 
countries. These countries were Japan, the European Union and China for wheat and the 
European Union, Korea and China for coarse grain. Liberalisation in Korea accounted 
for much of the gain for oilseeds. Reducing market access barriers in China, India and 
Pakistan accounted for the gain from palm oil trade liberalisation in the first experiment 
while it was China and Pakistan only in the second experiment. All these countries, with 
the exception of India and Pakistan, applied their actual WTO bound rates when most 
other countries had applied rates that were much lower than their bound rates. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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Appendix A: ABARE Grains Model (AGM) 
 
ABARE’s Grains Model is a partial equilibrium model of world trade in wheat, coarse 
grains and oilseed products. It is based on the OECD AGLINK, extended and enhanced 
to explicitly model the import demand and market access policies of all the world’s 
major grain importers. 
Regional coverage 
The OECD version of AGLINK represents trade flows mainly between OECD member 
countries as well as China and Argentina, two trading partners important to the OECD. 
The countries modeled individually in the OECD AGLINK model include most of the 
major grain exporting countries in temperate regions, but represent a smaller proportion 
of  importers.  The  importing  countries  not  explicitly  modeled  are  aggregated  into  a 
single region known as rest of world. This means that individual country models in 
OECD  AGLINK  only  represent  a  small  proportion  of  world  imports  for  many 
commodities (table 4). 
4 Share of world imports in 2000 in OECD AGLINK and ABARE Grains Model 2000 
  OECD AGLINK  ABARE Grains Model 
  %  % 
Wheat  25  88 
Coarse grains  55  93 
Oilseeds  79  99 
Oilseed meal  68  93 
Oilseed oil  21  74 
Palm oil  30  83 
 
Market  access  policies  applied  to  agricultural  commodities  differ  greatly  between 
importing countries. Accurately specifying applied market access policies is essential 
for  modeling  constraints  to  trade  and  the  potential  effects  of  global  liberalisation. 
ABARE  has  extended  the  OECD  AGLINK  model  to  represent  the  imports  of  an 
additional 45 countries  for cereals  and the oilseed  complex. This means that in the 
ABARE  Grains  Model,  a  much  higher  proportion  of  world  imports  is  explicitly 
represented  in  individual  country  models  (table  4).  In  general,  import  demand  was 
represented individually for each commodity in each country if imports in the year 2000 
exceeded  500  000  tonnes  for  wheat  or  coarse  grain  or  200  000  tonnes  for  oilseed 
products and palm oil. Additional countries were modeled individually if it was judged 
that trade barriers restricted imports below these levels. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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AGLINK crop models 
The standard OECD AGLINK model mathematically represents the domestic demand 
and supply of grain and oilseed products for OECD countries, as well as Argentina and 
China. For the AGLINK countries, crop supply is typically modeled as the product of 
area harvested and yield (figure T). The area of each crop harvested depends on the 
relative returns from alternative crops, and between cropping and livestock production. 
Yield is influenced by price, implicitly through variable input use, and long term trends 
reflecting productivity improvements. 



































The demand for grain in AGLINK depends on both human consumption and livestock 
feed demand. The per capita demand for grain as food depends on the products own 
price,  and  the  price  of  substitutes,  including  other  grain,  and  complements  such  as 
livestock products. The demand for feed grain depends on livestock production, and the 
price of other feeds including oilseed meal. 
For most countries, the demand for oilseeds is derived from the demand for the two 
products of crushing oilseeds, oilseed meal and oilseed oil. In general, higher meal and 
oil prices relative to seed price will result in increased crush of oilseeds, and vice versa. 
The use of oilseeds directly as food is modeled for China, Indonesia, Japan and South 
Korea, and directly for feed use in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and the United States. ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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Modeling import demand 
To model import demand in ABARE’s Grains Model it is assumed that consumers and 
processors differentiate between imported and domestically produced grain and oilseed 
products, and can substitute between the two (Shaw and Love 2001). The demand for 
imports and domestically produced grain products are specified separately in the model. 
Import demand equations were added to the standard OECD AGLINK representations 
of China, the European Union, Japan and Korea.  
Modeling tariff rate quotas 
Modeling TRQ’s in ABARE’s Grains Model follows an accepted economic approach 
described by Abbott and Morse (2000), and recently applied to this type of modeling by 
Shaw and Love (2001). The model includes a representation of demand with prices that 
include both the in-quota and above-quota tariffs (figures U–W). When demand is low 
(high),  the  price  of  imports  is  determined  by  the  in-quota  (above)  tariff.  When  the 
demand is on the quota, the shadow quota price ranges between the in and above-quota 
tariff levels. 
If demand is low, the demand curve will intersect the in-quota tariff price resulting in 
imports below the quota volume (Qt1 in figure U). In this case it is the in-quota tariff 
that restricts trade, and removing this tariff would result in a higher level of imports 
(Q*1). Expanding the quota or reducing the above-quota tariff may have no effect on 
imports when demand is low. 
U Tariff rate quota with in-quota tariff binding 
  Price 
Imports 
Quota 
World price + in  - 
quota tariff 
World price +  
above  -  quota tariff 
World price 
Market access  
reduced by the in  - 
quota tariff 




World price + in  - 
quota tariff 
World price +  
above  -  quota tariff 
World price 
Market access  
reduced by the in  - 
quota tariff 
Q* 1  Qt 1 
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Depending on the level of demand, imports can be restricted to the tariff quota quantity 
and the shadow quota price will range between the in and above-quota price levels 
(figure V). The shadow price indicates the amount of rent generated by restricting the 
quantity of imports, which can be imported at the in-quota price but sold for a higher 
price on the domestic market. This rent can be auctioned to importers, allocated to 
foreign  exporters,  or  dissipated  through  rent  seeking  behaviour  and  inefficient 
distribution systems. 
When the quota restricts trade, reducing the in-quota tariff increases the amount of rent 
available, but does not increase the level of imports. Increasing the quota alone will 
increase imports until the quota price falls to the in-quota tariff level, at which point 
quota rent will be eliminated. Reducing the above-quota tariff will not increase imports 
unless  it  reduces  the  above-quota  price  below  the  shadow  quota  price.  Only  by 
removing both the quota and tariffs will imports increase to the free market level (Q*2). 
V Tariff rate quota with quota binding 
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World price + in  - 
quota tariff 
World price +  
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If demand is high enough, the demand curve will intersect the above-quota tariff price 
resulting in imports above the quota volume (Qt3 in figure W). When the above-quota 
tariff restricts trade, removing this tariff would increase imports until the price falls to 
the in-quota tariff level (Qi). Reducing the in-quota tariff alone has no effect on imports 
when the above-quota tariff is binding. The effect of expanding the quota depends on 
the magnitude of the increase relative to demand. A small increase may have no effect, 
with demand remaining above-quota. Larger increases could cause the shadow quota 
price  to  fall  below  the  above-quota  level,  and  make  the  quota  binding.  Very  large ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 03.1 
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increases could result in the import price falling to the in-quota level. The quota and 
both tariffs need to be removed to achieve the free trade level of imports (Q*). 
W Tariff rate quota with above-quota tariff binding 
  Price 
Imports 
Quota 
World price + in  - 
quota tariff 
World price +  
above  -  quota tariff 
World price 
Market access  
reduced by the  
above  -  quota tariff 




World price + in  - 
quota tariff 
World price +  
above  -  quota tariff 
World price 
Market access  
reduced by the  
above  -  quota tariff 
Q*  Qt 3  Q i 
 
Supply response 
As a model of temperate agriculture, the OECD AGLINK model represents over 90 per 
cent of the world’s wheat and coarse grain exports through individual country model. 
ABARE Grains Model has a similar level of representation for oilseed products by 
modeling  Brazilian  production  and  consumption,  and  for  palm  oil  by  modeling 
Indonesian and Malaysian production and consumption. 
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